Media content in the Central African crisis: an overview and solutions for further peace-building and governance interventions

Internews Network

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The main findings on media content currently edited and broadcast in the Central African Republic comes from the analysis of data and information provided by the media monitoring team of the Central African self-regulatory body: Observatoire des Médias Centrafricains (OMCA - Observatory of the Central African media sector).

OMCA specific media monitoring has been supported by Internews with the support of USAID and Institut Panos Europe (project Médias indépendants pour la consolidation de la démocratie funded by France and the European Union).

This report does not necessarily reflect USAID views.
1 Executive summary

1.1 Context

1. The Central African Republic is a landlocked country and one of the poorest and underdeveloped in the world. The country has experienced close to two decades to conflicts since 1996, including the Central African Bush Wars from 2001.

2. After the seizure of Bangui by the Seleka, a Muslim-led coalition of armed groups, in March 2013, the conflict turned progressively into a sectarian conflict between non-Muslim (Christians and animists) and Muslim communities.

3. In December 2013, the Anti-Balaka militia (a Christian-led coalition) tried to seize Bangui. Repression by the Seleka resulted in the death of 800 to 1,200 people. International NGOs, France and the United Nations warned of a potential genocide after the number of attacks against Muslim civilians and retaliation against Christians increased rapidly since September.

4. The transition process is supposed to lead to general elections in February 2015 and a new Constitution.

5. The sectarian conflict has embraced other socio-economic issues that have caused anger and prejudice in the non-Muslim population. These prejudices and stereotypes are the basis of hate speech registered in the media content produced during the media monitoring period.

1.2 The Central African Media Sector

6. The Central Media regulation framework has never been functional: The law established the High Council for Communication Matters (Haut Conseil de la Communication - HCC), the public media regulator as an independent institution including media professionals. But, the HCC has suffered from weak internal organizational capacity and its lack of credibility towards media professionals. The transitional HCC was been re-established in May 2014 but has no resources to be operational: the HCC office was destroyed in 2013.

7. The self-regulatory body, the Observatory of Central African Media (Observatoire des Médias Centrafricains - OMCA) already suffered from a lack of resources before the crisis. The organization is an association of journalists, who have no sufficient income to share with professional associations. The wages are very low and most of them have never signed a contract with their employers.

8. Media regulation bodies are currently not able to monitor media content produced throughout the country, prevent hate speech or discriminating content or guarantee equal access to media for politicians during the transition.

9. Radio is by far the most used and accessible media in the Central African Republic.

10. Radio Centrafrique, the public broadcaster, is still run like a state media agency but the control of the government is currently limited. Radio Centrafrique suffered from looting. Two transmitters (MW and SW) were stolen in 2013: Radio Centrafrique only broadcasts in FM in Bangui. The public broadcaster is currently not able to produce more than 70% of the programs forecast in its internal schedule. Most of the programs that should have been produced by different public administrations and broadcasted by Radio Centrafrique are not produced due to the collapse of the state. As a result Radio Centrafrique is currently only able to broadcast nearly 50% of the programs.
11. Radio Ndeke Luka is the main private sector radio, broadcast in FM in Bangui, Bouar and Bambari, as well as for 2 hours per day in short wave (in partnership with Radio ICDI located in Boali, 100 km north of Bangui). Supported by the international community through the Swiss NGO, Fondation Hirondelle, it is currently the only media outlet able to produce and broadcast high quality information content throughout the country.

12. The longer established community radio stations in the Central African Republic are often confessional or supported by the Catholic Church. They received relatively important support per radio since the beginning of 2000s and are now relatively professional. Many of them suffered from looting during the conflict and are not currently operating. However, an important number of community radios stations are newly established (spontaneous creations of community radios, international programs supporting the development of community radios). Their need for capacity building is important.

13. Pure commercial radio stations do not exist in the Central African Republic.

14. The only TV channel is the state-owned Tele Centrafrique (TVCA) which is still run like a state media channel. The TVCA transmitter only covers Bangui.

15. No important media outlets (radio and TV) are owned or supported by a politician.

16. The print press and information websites are extremely politicized except the ACAP and RJDH websites (respectively edited by the public Central African Press Agency and the Association of Journalists for Human Rights, which is supported by Internews). Its impact on the local population is limited, but the print press and information websites are read by opinion leaders.

17. Media professional organizations (MPO) are relatively operational but institutionally weak because they rely mainly on one or two individuals. Their role is central in the structure of the media sector. The main MPOs (UJCA, OMCA, ARC-Centrafrique, AFPC, and RDJH) have developed efficient cooperation. Most of them share an office at the Press and Journalists House (Maison de la Presse et des Journalistes - MPJ).

18. As of May, 31st 2014, less than half of the radio stations operating in conflict areas including Bangui are operational. In Bangui, only three radio stations out of twelve (Radio Centrafrique, Radio Ndeke Luka, Radio Notre Dame) are producing news and information.

1.3 Main Findings – Specific Media Monitoring on the treatment of news related to the current conflict

19. Internews, in cooperation with Institut Panos Europe, supported and reinforced the OMCA media monitoring team. Six analysts and a coordinator monitored from April, 19th to May 18th six radio stations located in Bangui, six daily newspapers and four websites, which resulted in 248 hours of news and information radio programs and 448 articles that were been analyzed.

News and information radio programs

20. Data gathered by the OMCA media monitoring team shows a focus on the production of news and information content (50% of official schedules in monitored radio stations) and gives information on the situation of gender in the Central African media sector.
21. News represents 23% of the total schedule on the six radio stations monitored during this period. The situation of conflict had a direct influence on the subjects treated in news and information content with a focus 1) on the conflict (more than one third of news and information content) but not on grassroots conflict mitigation activities (2.6%) and 2) on politics (one third of news and information content). Security issues are the main subject related to the need of the population while social subjects (food security, health and education) do not seem to be a priority at the moment.

22. Central African media outlets serve the role of provider of local and national news. International news is considered to be provided by international media outlets like Radio France Internationale, which is available on FM in Bangui and short wave.

Gender issues in the media sector

23. The role of women journalists producing content is significantly different in the print press than in radio stations. Women represent 1% of the author identified in reports non-related to entertainment (monitored by OMCA media monitoring team) in the print press.

24. In radio stations, 38.4% of news and information content is produced by women: a high rate considering discrimination against women in education and in enterprises in the Central African Republic.

25. Two thirds of the sources used by journalists are women.

26. Magazines dedicated to gender issues represent less than 1% of the schedule. The OMCA media monitoring framework does not provide data on gender sensitivity of media content produced by Central African journalists.

27. An assessment on gender issues in the media sector is needed to evaluate in what extent the media can change the image of women in the Central African society (women participation to peace and political processes) by specific media monitoring and the inclusion of women in media enterprises, notably in management positions.

Hate speech seems to be limited to print press

28. OMCA media monitoring registered six important violations, which have been the subject of detailed reports to the OMCA Board (rapport circonstancié). In weekly reports, 21 cases have been identified. However, analysts registered in the database 74 elements of hate speech in the print press and only four in media content broadcast by radio stations.
29. Nature of hate speech:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hate speech</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stereotype</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insults</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanization of member of a community</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridicule or deriding an individual or a community</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-explicit expressions discriminating individuals or a community</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertions which are an incentive to violence</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defamation</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30. Hate speech semantic framework related to the current sectarian conflict in Central African media outlets April/May 2014:

- victimization of the Christian community,
- no mention of exactions against members of the Muslim community,
- amalgam between Seleka fighters and members of the Muslim community or denial of the existence of a Central African Muslim community (or identification of “real” Central African to members of the Christian community),
- calls for a serious or violent reaction of members of the Christian community.

31. The lack of professionalism in the production of news and information content by Central African journalists is characterized by the presence of the unsubstantiated statements, notably in the print press, due to the lack of credible sources and cross-check of information. Only 47.8% of the sources identified in the reports published in the print press are considered to be credible by the OMCA media monitoring team (92.8% for radio content).

32. In the print press, the lack of credibility is equally explained by the use of unchecked second hand sources (33.7%), non-identified sources (38.9%) and sources for which the scale of expertise is not related with the subject enough (27.4%). For radio content, the lack of credible sources is caused by the use of unchecked second hand sources (69.8%), mostly from people which are close to Christian victims, and non-identified sources (30.2%).

33. OMCA media monitoring data shows 77.6% of reports published in the print press present a bias (content related to politics and coverage of conflict), against 1.3% for radio news and information content. Print press journalists often use unsubstantiated assertions and elements to demonstrate their argument.

34. The Central African print press is an opinion press. Only 23.2% of the content monitored in the print press did not include comments, against 95.3% in the radio content. Central African newspapers are not sustainable: journalists and managers are subject to bribery and sell political communication services.
Lack of sensitivity to the conflict

35. More than 95% of radio reports do not include comments from journalists.

36. However, the access to media for both belligerent and antagonist communities is not equal in radio content.

Source of information/interviews in reports broadcast on radio stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Information/Interviews</th>
<th>Christian/Anti-Balakas</th>
<th>Muslim/Selekas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters/Leaders Armed groups</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. In reports on interreligious peace initiatives, interviews of Muslim religious leaders are often missing when catholic and protestant leaders are always interviewed by reporters.

38. Journalists explain this lack of equilibrium by security issues: most of them are Christian and therefore do not have secure access to areas controlled by Seleka fighters. Community radio stations have often a Christian confessional background, which explains why they offer a privileged access to Christian religious leaders to media.

39. Due to the focus of Christian victims as source of information on the conflict, journalists tend to use the same vocabulary strengthening the amalgam between Muslim bandits, Seleka fighters and the whole Muslim communities.

40. In the print press, the publication of articles edited for foreign public in the international press may lead to misunderstandings and violence in a country where media literacy is still weak. Press releases from armed groups are published without any precautions in the lay out or any warning.

Lack of peace journalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part in radio content</th>
<th>Part in content published in the print press</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>Explanation of the causes of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>Basic needs of the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>Inclusive research of solutions to the conflict (debate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41. The print press contains more reflections and elements of discussion on the explanation of the cause of the conflict and the research than radio which is specialized in pressing news. However, due to the presence of hate speech in the print press, 19.2% of articles presenting or discussing solutions to the conflict propose the radical answer “Muslims must leave the Central African Republic” against 2.3% in radio reports.
42. More than half of the reports broadcast on radio give information on the basic needs of the population: security is the first need expressed by citizens or journalists (72.6% of civic expressed requests on basic needs).

43. Only peace and conflict mitigation ceremonies organized by the government and religious authorities are treated by media. There is no follow-up or inclusive debate on the research of solutions. The participation of this debate is limited to politicians.

44. Radio stations are not able to organize inclusive debates on the research of peace and conflict mitigation solutions because of:
   - Journalists do not explain the causes of the conflict
   - Production of inclusive content is costly and limited due to security issues
   - Lack of capacity in peace journalism: peace journalism is not limited to reporting on workshops, but includes inclusive work of organizational information and debates around the causes of the conflict, basic needs of the population (including providers of assistance, i.e. public decision makers and the humanitarian community) and partners for a research of solutions at local and national levels.
   - Weak relations with civil society organizations working on these processes

1.4 Recommendations

The following recommendations have been designed with the objective of:

   - Reinforcing media regulation to prevent hate and discriminatory speeches
   - Capacity building in conflict-sensitive journalism
   - Enhance production of media content that helps promoting peace and addressing root causes of the conflict (struggle for resources, failure of state and its institutions, failure of non-violent processes of designation of public decision makers).
   - The collaboration of media actors with humanitarian actors, institutions supporting democracy in the Central African Republic (HCCT, ANE) and the civil society organizations for enhancing the positive role that the Central African media sector may play in the peace building process.
Support and mentor Central African journalists in the production of conflict sensitive content

The lack of sensitivity to conflict of radio journalists is the main structural issue in regards to the impact of radio amongst populations.

R.1. Train and mentor journalists in conflict sensitive journalism (hands on training sessions)

R.2. Support the production of conflict sensitive information content in covering the entire country

R.3. Promote the production of information on basic needs of the population (humanitarian news and information, news on security issues)

Support the media regulation bodies

R.4. Support the establishment of a specific emergency media monitoring system

R.5. Enhance technical capacities in media regulation

R.6. Support the institutional building process (public media regulator)

Support the development of an inclusive democratic debate including the research of peace and institutional solutions for mitigate the conflict in a sustainable way

R.7. Support the production of debates or content enhancing the debate with focus on causes and solutions to the conflict

R.8. Enhance collaboration between media, civil society and international organizations supporting peacebuilding, social cohesion, institutional building processes

R.9. Promote peace journalism

Enhance the credibility of transitional institutions (accountability of transitional government)

R.10. Enhance accountability and transparency processes during the redeployment and reform of security forces
R.11 Enhance accountability and transparency for transitional government actions
R.12 Promote and support investigative journalism
R.13 Promote women participation in modifying its social image through the media

Enhance the credibility of the electoral process as a piece of the peace building process

R.14 Support electoral education activities through the media
R.15 Support capacity building for electoral coverage
R.16 Enhance accountability and transparency of the electoral operations through media
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3 Context

The Central African Republic is a landlocked and extremely under-developed country. The country ranked 180 out of 187 in the Human Development Index in 2012. After a decade of conflicts (recurrent insurgencies from 1996-2006), president Bozize and the international community managed to maintain precarious peace in signing agreements with the numerous armed groups localized in the northern part of the country. The Central African Republic is also affected by the presence of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the eastern part of the country.

A history of poor governance that lead to the collapse of the state

Since the independence from France in 1960, the Central African Republic has experienced a series of coups, dictatorships with the climax of the establishment of a Central African Empire. In the late 1990s, the Central African Republic experienced series of coups and conflict in Bangui, then from 2011 in the whole country. Many ex-Seleka armed groups have been involved in the Central African Republic Bush Wars from 2003.

Corruption and lack of transparency in public management never gave the country a chance to develop.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central African Republic: main figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population:</strong> 5.2 millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita:</strong> 479 USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size:</strong> 622,984 sq.km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considered as the Christian community: 85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African religious belief: 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant: 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic: 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim: 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literacy:</strong> 56.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life:</strong> 50.9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median age:</strong> 19.3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban population:</strong> 39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major towns:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangui: 740,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berberati: 80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bambari: 45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poor:</strong> 71% of households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From a political conflict to a sectarian conflict

In August 2012, several Muslim-led armed groups\(^1\) of the North Eastern part of the country formed the Seleka (alliance in the national official language Sango, French is the other official language), after the first skirmishes between these armed groups and the Central African Army (Forces Armées Centrafricaines - FACA) in the beginning of 2012. The Seleka rapidly sized most of the cities located in the north-eastern part of the country. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS - CEEAC in French) decided to send forces (FOMAC mission) to help the Central African Government to hold back the rebels. Chad provided most of the soldiers included in FOMAC forces. The Seleka offensive was stopped in

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\(^1\) the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR – Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP – Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix) are the main ones. The Seleka also includes the Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK – Convention Patriotique pour le Salut du Kodro; Kodro means Country in sango); Two other less known groups based in northern CAR announced later their allegiance to the Seleka: the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC – Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain) and the Chadian group Popular Front for Recovery (FPR – Front Populaire pour le Redressement).
Sibut, a hundred kilometers from the capital city, Bangui. An agreement between the Seleka coalition and the government was signed in Libreville, Gabon.

However, the Seleka accused President Bozize of failing to abide the agreement and seized Bangui on March, 24, 2013. President Bozize fled. One of rebel leaders, Michel Djotodia, declared himself president. In a regional summit held in Ndjamena (Chad) in April 2013, Djotodia was recognized as leading the transition towards a new constitution and a new institutional framework. Nicolas Tiangaye, former human rights activist, was confirmed as prime minister, head of a Seleka-led government. A Transitional National Council (TNC) was also created to design the new constitution and oversee the organization of general elections before October 2015. This deadline has modified to February 2015 after a second regional summit in January 2014.

The government was unable to prevent the total collapse of an already very weak state. President Djotodia announced that the Seleka has been dissolved. But, the undisciplined Seleka militia continue to be on rampage in Bangui and throughout the country. By the end of 2013, 200 000 IDPs were registered by aid organizations.

Progressively, the conflict worsened and turned into a sectarian conflict between the Muslim and Christian communities. The Muslim community is accused of collusion with Seleka rebels by the Christians. Self-defense groups, Anti-Balakas (‘machete proof’ in sango) were created throughout the country to protect the population from unpunished Seleka militia exactions and abuses (the creation of Muslim-led anti-balakas were reported in the center of the country in September 2013 and a Internews resident journalism advisor met a Muslim Anti-Balaka leader in Berberati in April 2014). However, these groups quickly became Christian and anti-Muslim militiamen. Anti-Balaka groups targeted Muslims in response to Seleka exactions against Christian communities. Ex-Seleka fighters have responded by arming Muslim populations. Former president Bozize and his followers are accused notably by the UN of supporting Anti-Balaka groups. Soldiers who had been hired on an ethnic basis during Bozize’s reign and members of the former Presidential Guard joined to the Anti-Balakas, while Bozize’s partisans were providing political coherence to the movement.

On December 5th, an Anti-Balaka offensive was repelled by ex-Seleka forces in Bangui. Seleka fighters searched for infiltrated Anti-Balaka elements in popular neighborhoods: between 800 and 1,200 civilians died during the operation. Attacks against the Muslims began to spread all over the country. The situation was qualified as “descending into chaos” by the United Nations. The United Nations and France warned about a potential genocide in December 2013 and January 2014. France decided the deployment of 1,200 soldiers under UN mandate (operation Sangaris) to support the African peace-keeping mission (International Support Mission for the Central African Republic - Mission international de soutien à la Centrafrique, MISCA, in French).

In January 2014, Michel Djotodia and the government resigned after a second regional summit. Catherine Samba-Panza was then appointed as transitional president.

Chad withdrew its 830-men strong MISCA contingent after Chadian troops opened fire on Anti-Balaka militiamen and civilians in the last days of March 2014.

In April 2014, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an 11,800 member peacekeeping force, the MINUSCA (UN Mission for the Stabilization of the Central African Republic, Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation de la République Centrafricaine in French) for September 2014. The UN Resolution 2149 also calls for general elections to be held before February 2015. The first deployment of the EU peacekeeping force (EUFOR) occurred in April 2014. Widespread (Occasional) violence continued unabated.

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2 See They Came to Kill: escalation of violence in the Central African Republic, Human Rights Watch, December 2013
According to the UNHCR, half of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance: 2.5 million people of which 600,000 are IDPs. Over 350,000 people fled to Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Most of the Muslims flew from the western part of the country to the eastern part, controlled by the Seleka.

The sectarian conflict is however considered by many observers as the last stage of the deliquescence of the state and any form of social contract that the Central African Republic may have had in the past. The conflict can also be explained by socio-economic factors (see Table 1 Sources of tension between Muslims and Christians in the CAR) notably due to the failure of the state after decades of weak governance and low-intensity conflicts.

Table 1: Current crisis in the Central African Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</table>
| Dec 2010      | President Bozize is reelected
His coalition wins and have the majority in the Parliament (National Assembly)
Opposition and international observers suspect fraud.
The level of confidence of the public opinion on the fairness of the electoral process is low. |
| August 2012   | North-eastern armed groups (mostly Muslim fighters) form the Seleka (alliance in sango, the lingua franca in the Central African Republic)       |
| December 2012 | ECCAS send additional troupes to the CAR. Seleka offensive is stopped in Sibut, 100 km north of Bangui                                         |
| January 2013  | A cease fire agreement signed in Libreville, Gabon
A unity government, led by a former human rights activist, is established.                                                                       |
| March 2013    | Seleka seizes Bangui, President Bozize flees and Michel Djotodia declares himself president                                                  |
| July 213      | AU stabilization mission (MISCA) replaces ECCAS stabilization mission (MICOPAX)                                                               |
| August 2013   | Michel Djotodia sworn in as head of the political transition                                                                               |
| September 2013| Amid President Djotodia order to disband, exactions by Seleka fighters continue throughout the country
First important skirmishes with Anti-Balakas militia
First important attacks against Muslim civilians                                           |
| December 2013 | Anti Balakas attack on Bangui, repelled by Seleka fighters. Repression costs between 800 and 1,200 civilians mostly Christian.
Numerous attacks against Muslim civilians. France, international NGOs and the UN starts to warn against genocide.
Beginning of the French operation Sangaris
UN Resolution 2127 authorizes MISCA and French troops to protect civilians and to act for the stabilization of the country, declares an embargo on arms and mandate investigations on human rights violations. |
| January 2014  | President Djotodia and the unity government resign under international pressure (second regional summit)
Catherine Samba-Panza is appointed as transitional president                                   |
| April 2014    | UN Resolution authorizes UN peace keeping mission in CAR (11,800 soldiers).                                                                      |
| September 2014| Expected beginning of the deployment of the UN Peace keeping mission                                                                         |
| February 2015 | Expected date for the general elections                                                                                                      |

3 Source: Conflict in the Central African Republic: it’s not just about religion, Liesl Louw-Vaudran, February, 26th, 2014, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria (South Africa)
Peace, Institutions and Government: everything is to be rebuilt

Before the conflict, the CAR population was estimated to be 15% Muslim and 85% non-Muslim (Catholic, Protestant and African religious beliefs). The Muslim community is still heterogeneous. Most of the anger of the Christian communities targets people from Chadian origin and people from the north-east of the country (Vakaga prefecture), notably the Rungas and the Gulas, as most of Central African Seleka fighters are members of these ethnic groups. Muslim members of south-eastern ethnicity, considered as Central Africans by most of the population, are less targeted because their way of living is perceived as being less different.

Table 2: Source of tension between Muslims and Christians in the CAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of tension between Muslims and Christians in the CAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the pre-colonial period, the current Central African population suffered from slave-raiding attacks from current Chad and Sudan Muslim traders. Muslim ethnic groups from Vakaga and Bamingui Bangoran (North-East) participated to the traffic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminating idea / source of potential violence: Muslims are raiders, stealing resources of “true Central Africans”. These feelings have grown in the past decade (2002/2014) among non-Muslim Central Africans because of the Central African Bush War (where Muslim armed groups that later formed the Seleka were belligerents) and the participation of Chadian fighters in Bozize’s rebellion (2001/2003). The fact that an important number of Sudanese and Chadian fighters participated to these conflicts reinforced the idea that Central African Muslims are “foreigners” raiding Central African resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During the colonial period and since independence, the political power is in the hand of Southerners and Westerners. Northern regions and nomadic herders (mostly Muslims) did not benefit from public investment due to the extreme centralization of the political power in Bangui and the weakness of the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminating idea / source of potential violence: Muslim northerners and nomadic herders feel politically discriminated, notably on access to public resources. Since the Muslim population did not participate in social and political debate, it reinforced the Non-Muslim Central Africans’ idea that Northerners and Muslims are “foreigners”. Some of the Muslim community members benefitted from their ethnic and religious proximity to the Seleka fighters to limit their losses during the Seleka rampages in 2013: this reinforced the idea amongst non-Muslim Central Africans that most of the Muslim community members denied or relinquished their Central African nationality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chadian origin of most of the members of the Muslim community, notably in urban areas. Chad has had a central role in the Central African conflicts. Chad is notably accused of playing an important role in the destabilization of the country by non-Muslim Central Africans (support to Bozize and Seleka rebellions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminating idea / source of potential violence: Muslims are “Chadians” and « Chadians » are Muslims. The ambiguous actions of the MISCA Chadian contingent have been strongly questioned by non-Muslim Central Africans. “They are protecting their compatriots” was a widely spread idea amongst non-Muslim Central Africans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tensions between herders and farmers over access to land and tenures. Herders are mostly nomadic Muslim Peuls, while farmers are mostly non-Muslim (Christian or following African beliefs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminating idea / source of potential violence: Muslims are “foreigner invaders” drawing our resources away.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominance of Muslim community members over sheep and cattle raising, trade and informal financial services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminating idea / source of potential violence: Perception of a Muslim control over prices and capital by non-Muslim Central Africans. Herders have been targeted for decades by bandits because of their supposed wealth: when they sell cattle, they are in possession of important liquidities but are not richer than average farmers. In urban areas, many Muslim community members possess an important cash stock compared to the average stock of cash because of their activities as small traders. However, the predominance of Muslims in trade, transport and informal financial services made rich an important number of people belonging to the Muslim community. They live in non-wealthy neighborhood like Km5, Miskine or PK 12 in Bangui, unlike non-Muslim rich. They are therefore more accessible and visible. They are therefore more targeted by socio-economic frustrations than other rich social classes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Source : Crisis in the Central African Republic, Alexis Arieff, Congressional Research Service, Washington, May 2014
Security forces do not control more than the central neighborhood of Bangui. The first deployment of police forces began in April 2014. Most of government is not functioning properly. As an example, civil registration and archives have been destroyed in most of the cities in the eastern part of the country. When functioning, institutions and public organizations are run independently. No social policy and strategy of intervention addressing social needs, notably in the health and education sectors, can currently be implemented by the government.

Under these conditions, the transition and the organization of general elections in February represent an important challenge for the government and the international community.
4 The Central African media sector

In a country with such a high illiteracy rate (56.6% - estimation 2011) as the Central African Republic, radio remains the main media. Two-thirds of illiterate people are women. The high illiteracy rate is a limiting factor for the development of the print press and the internet. The cost and the lack of access to electricity limit the number of television viewers: few people can afford a television.

The CAR media sector is also characterized by its under-development compared to neighboring countries such as Cameroon or the Democratic Republic of Congo.

4.1 Media regulation framework

In 1998, the parliament adopted two media laws for the regulation of the sector (law n°98/006 on press freedom and law 98/005 establishing the High Council of Communication, the public media regulator). But these two laws have yet to be enforced, due to the many conflicts that have plagued the country.

In 2005, President Bozize modified by ordinance the law n°98/006 and issued the ordinance 05.2005 - 22nd February 2005 which currently regulates press freedom in the Central African Republic, and is the current basis of the media regulation framework.

The ordinance 05.2005 is relatively liberal compared to other media laws in neighboring countries. Jail sentences for press offence have nearly disappeared from the media law, notably for defamation. Most of press offences, except hate speech, actions undermining national security (“atteintes à la sureté de l'Etat” in French) and insulting the president (“offense au Chef de l'Etat”) are no longer listed in the Penal Code. With the issuance of this ordinance, media professionals realized that they had obtained a decriminalization of press offences.

However, the media regulation bodies failed to preserve and guarantee press freedom because of their institutional weakness. Authorities still use provisions of the Penal Code and ignore media laws to put pressure on journalists or put them in jail.

Haut Conseil de la Communication (High Council for Communication matters): the public media regulator

The law 06.008 (loi 06.008 du 6 juin 2006 portant sur l’organisation et le fonctionnement du Haut Conseil de la Communication) modified the previous law 98/005 establishing the High Council for Communication matters (HCC).

The HCC is designed as an independent public institution. The Board has 9 members nominated by the President, the National Assembly and media professionals’ organizations (public and private sectors).

Due to conflicts and dissension between media professionals and the government, the HCC had not been functioning until 2009. The weak capacities of the institution have never ensured its credibility despite international support in 2011/2012, during and after the electoral cycle. This support strengthened the legal and media monitoring departments, but its lack of independence remained a strong limit to its credibility to media professionals, civil

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5 Ordonnance 05.2005 du 22 février 2005 relative à la liberté de communication
society organizations and politicians, as it failed to preserve the equal access of the media to the presidential candidates during the 2011 electoral period.

However, the technical assistance provided by Institut Panos Europe led to the design of a development plan to progressively reinforce its institutional credibility before the next elections, at that time, forecast for 2016.

Observatoire des Médias Centrafricains (Observatory of Central African Media): the self-regulatory body

The Observatory of Central African Media (Observatoire des Médias Centrafricains - OMCA in its French acronym) was established in December 2005 by the Association of Central African journalists (Union des Journalistes Centrafricains -UJCA in its French acronym), the main professional organization. The self-regulatory body was poorly functioning. However, the Ordinance 05.2005 recognizes its complementary role to the HCC in the media regulation framework. The OMCA’s credibility towards media professionals is more important than of the HCC, because the self-regulatory is considered as independent from government.

The OMCA’s resources did not allow the organization to conduct efficient media monitoring, notably of radio content. The OMCA’s media monitoring activities aimed at improving ethics and professionalism. In 2012, a new Code of Ethics was issued. The OMCA then benefitted from institutional support and capacity building from Institut Panos Europe, which reinforced its credibility before the beginning of the institutional chaos in the Central African Republic.

In case of important violations of the Code of Ethics, the OMCA media monitoring team can produce a detailed report (rapport circonstancié) for the OMCA board to decide whether the journalist or the media outlet must be warned or sanctioned or if the case needs to be referred to the public media regulator (Haut Conseil de la Communication) in case the violation could be considered as an offense to the Media law (ordinance 05.2005 – 22nd February 2005 currently regulating press freedom in the Central African Republic).

Table 3: Media legal framework in the Central African Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Penal Code</th>
<th>Provisions related to insults, defamation and hate speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Penal Code</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinance 05.2005 – 22nd February 2005, regulating press freedom in the Central African Republic (Ordonnance 05.2005 du 22 février 2005 relative à l’exercice de la liberté de presse)</td>
<td>Currently regulating media content (publication and broadcast) A few provisions on the access to the market (status of journalists, status of community radios, declaration, access to frequencies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law 06.008 – 6th June 2006, internal organization of the High Council for Communication matters (HCC) (loi 06.008 du 6 juin 2006 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Haut Conseil de la Communication)</td>
<td>Defines the HCC’s internal organization and public media regulation procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-regulation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Temporary provisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive n’001/11/HCC – 5th January 2011, regulation of the electoral campaign in the media for 2011 presidential and legislative elections</td>
<td>Regulation of the electoral campaign in the media for 2011 presidential and legislative elections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Central African media outlets

Radio is the main media in the Central African Republic. The impact of the country’s only television channel, TVCA, is marginal, while the impact of the print press is limited to opinion leaders in Bangui.

Outside Bangui, the rural population has limited access to information despite the development of community radios.

Radio stations

Radio stations are the most professionally run media outlets. Commercial radio stations do not exist in the Central African Republic due to the weakness of the advertising market. The only commercial radio station was Tropic FM, which suspended operations in March 2013. The private sector only includes community radio stations and a private sector radio station supported by the international community through the Swiss NGO, Fondation Hirondelle, Radio Ndeke Luka.

The main characteristic of Central African radio stations is that no media outlets are owned by politicians or have been created with the objective of supporting political interests, although Radio Centrafrique, the public sector radio station, remains a state media. The only commercial radio station which has been owned by a politician was Tropic FM in Bangui. Formerly a businessman, the owner, Alfred Poloko, was appointed on several occasions as Advisor to President Bozize and the Minister of Communication. Media operations of his media group ceased with the fall of Bozize in March 2013.

Radio Centrafrique is the public broadcaster. Before the crisis, it was the only media able to cover the entire country all day with two 50 Kw transmitters (medium wave and short wave). Radio Centrafrique also broadcasts in FM in Bangui. Radio Centrafrique produces 70% of its media content in Sango, the national language, and 30% in French. As a state media, it broadcast content (magazines) produced by the communication departments in each ministry and by the presidential administration. The radio station is a department of the Ministry of Communication. In the recent past, social and political actors criticized its lack of pluralism in the news and news magazines. Regarding the management of equipment and archives, human resources remain the main challenge for the management of the national public broadcaster. No recruitment has been authorized by the government for 10 years. For example, only six staff members are dedicated to the production of reports and news magazines6. Most of the staff is close to retirement. Stringers are most of time employed as permanent staffers with very low wages, as their recruitment has been authorized by the government. Most of them have little qualifications in journalism.

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The Rural Radio is a specific Radio Centrafrique department that produces specific content targeting rural areas and provides news from correspondents placed in the 11 prefectures of the country. This service has been affected by the current crisis.

Radio Ndeke Luka is run by the Fondation Ndeke Luka, a Central African association supported by the Swiss NGO Fondation Hirondelle, with the support of international donors. Radio Ndeke Luka broadcasts in FM in Bangui, Bouar and Bambari, and two hours per day on short wave thanks to an agreement with Radio ICDI based in Boali, 90 km north of Bangui.

**Community radio stations**

Most of the older community radio stations have been created by the Catholic Church, and later by protestant movements, in rural and urban areas. Most of them are members of the Association of Community Radios (ARC Centrafrique). This association is a spin-off of the association of Catholic media. ARC Centrafrique\(^7\) was established in 2009: all of the 16 Central African community radio stations then joined the organization. Most of these community radio stations supported by the Church were established in the 1990s. However, there are no pure confessional radio stations in the Central African Republic: all of them make their objective of informing the community through the production of news and information magazines.

Most of the time, secular community radio stations were created with the support or the framework of aid programs in the 1990s, notably the OIF (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie - International organization of French-speaking countries)\(^8\).

With the noticeable support of the European Union, RFI Planète Radio provided support to the Central African community radio stations at the end of the 1990s and Institut Panos Europe to the institutional development of ARC Centrafrique. International organizations, notably UN agencies, cooperated with ARC-Centrafrique to produce collaborative content that was simultaneously broadcast throughout the country by member community radios (synergies in French). Since the beginning of the crisis in 2013, international organizations (Fondation Hirondelle, Search For Common Ground, RFI Planète Radio and Free Press Unlimited and Internews have provided support to community radio stations in cooperation with ARC-Centrafrique.

Community radio stations are not numerous (16 in 2009, 21 in 2012, before the current crisis) and not related to political interests. Moreover, cities outside Bangui are small: except Berberati, all the capital city of the country’s prefectures account for less than 50,000 inhabitants. In 2012, nearly 80 staff were working for community radio stations. Most of them have been trained since 2004 with the support of different international organizations. The first Central African Community radio stations, especially those located outside Bangui, received relatively important support per radio in capacity building (technical and in journalism), despite the lack of funding for media development program in the CAR. This explains the relative independence and professionalism of the longer-established community radios. For example, journalists working for community radio stations outside Bangui were targeted by repressive local authorities for their independence during the 2010/2011 electoral process. In October 2010, ARC-Centrafrique published a press release to raise the awareness of central government and the civil society on this issue\(^9\). RFI and BBC Africa broadcast in FM in Bangui. RFI is however the only popular international media in the Central Africa Republic.

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7. [http://www.arc-radios-communautaires.net](http://www.arc-radios-communautaires.net)
8. These radios have been supported by the Catholic Church after the end of OIF programme
Table 4: Radio stations in the Central African Republic and operational situation as for May 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public sector Radio station</th>
<th>Commercial radio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio Centrafrique</td>
<td>Radio Ndeke Luka (although more than half of its budget is provided by Fondation Hirondelle)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community radio stations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Member of the ARC – Centrafrique</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Radio Notre Dame (Bangui – Catholic Church);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Radio Néhémie (Bangui – protestant – activities suspended in May 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ESCA, Voix de la grâce (Bangui – protestant – non operational)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Voix de la Paix (Bangui – Muslim – non operational)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kuli Ndunga (Nola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Zoukpana (Berberati)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maïgaro (Bouar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Siriri (Bouar - Catholic) [<a href="http://www.radiosiriri.org/">http://www.radiosiriri.org/</a>]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maria Béafrika (Bossangoa – Catholic - non operational);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Songo de (M’Baiki – non operational)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linga FM (Bambari -non-operational)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Be Oko (Bambari - Catholic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linga FM (Bangui – non-operational but broadcast music)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Radio ICDI (Boali, supported by the American NGO ICDI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Non-member of ARC-Centrafrique, but requested membership:** |
| - Radio Zereda (Obo) |
| - Radio Yata (Birao - non-operational) |
| - Voix de Kaga (Kaga Bandoro – non operational) |
| - Radio Magbadja (Alindao) |
| - Radio Mbari (Bangassou – non operational); |
| - Radio Adnidussa (Mboki) |
| - Radio Berassa (Zémio) |
| - Radio Anissa (Rafai) |
| - Radio Yemusse (Djema) |

| **Eastern part (LRA affected areas):** |
| - Radio Adnidussa (Mboki) |
| - Radio Berassa (Zémio) |
| - Radio Anissa (Rafai) |
| - Radio Yemusse (Djema) |

| **Other areas:** |
| - Voix de la Pende (Paoua – non operational) |
| - Voix de l’Ouham (Bossangoa) |
| - Evangile et développement (Berberati – Catholic – operations to begin by the end of 2014) |
| - Radio Kota Gira (Damara – operations to begin by the end of 2014) |
| - Radio Life (Bimbo – operations to begin by the end of 2014) |
| - Radio Maria (Bimbo – Catholic – non-operational) |
| - Radio Ndjoku (Bayanga – operations to begin by the end of 2014) |

| **Community radios which have not requested membership to ARC Centrafrique:** |
| - Radio Barangbake (Bria) |
Television

Established in 1974, TV Centrafrique (TVCA) is the public broadcaster. Its equipment is obsolete. The TVCA coverage area is limited to Bangui: the first of two transmitters (2kW) is out of order while the second one (1kW) only delivers 200 w due to maintenance problems on the power transistor.

Until 2003, TVCA benefitted from continuous French technical assistance. In 2011, TVCA signed an agreement with the Chinese Pay TV operator, Startimes, to make it available on satellite. However, this partnership has been criticized: Albert Poloko, then Minister of Communication, was a shareholder of the local Startimes subsidiary. In the meantime, no policy improving the production of content (provision of equipment, capacity building plan) had been designed by the government.

Albert Poloko was also the owner of Tropic TV, a commercial TV channel. He obtained the license for broadcasting in 2007. However, the company never had the resources to produce content. Tropic TV only broadcasted music until its closure in March 2013, when the Seleka fighters seized Bangui.

TVCA is run as a state media, which most of the time produces news on governmental activities.

Most Central African households cannot afford a television. The wealthiest households who have a television prefer to watch the programs (international news and entertainment) that are broadcasted on foreign TV channels through satellite (Canal Plus, Startimes, DSTV). In poor neighborhoods in Bangui and small localities, little shacks equipped with TV and satellite pay TV subscription give a cheap access to entertainment programs: movies and soccer matches.

Press Print and Internet

ACAP (Agence Centrafricaine de Presse - Central African Press Agency) is the governmental press agency. Created in 1960, ACAP began to produce content in 1970s. But the government never provided it with the human and financial resources to develop its activities. Today, the agency mostly produces news on governmental activities, made available on its website: www.acap-cf.info. The reports produced by ACAP are the most professionally written and produced by the Central African print press. The RDJH website, www.rjdh-rca.net, was established in 2010 by the Association of Journalists for Human Rights (Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l’Homme in French). www.rjdh-rca.net is the information website which publishes the more high quality content in the Central African media sector: more than 50 articles are published each week. A network of correspondents based outside Bangui enables the RJDH desk office to gather information from rural areas. The RJDH website is the only information website able to provide high quality news and information from all part of the country. Its editorial line aims to treat information with a focus on human rights: the objective is to give information an added value for the defense and the protection of human rights. RJDH benefits from an important institutional and technical support provided by Internews: Internews staff mentors RDJH journalists guaranteeing an ongoing improvement of the quality of the content produced and published. RJDH has started to produce radio news and information content which is broadcast on partner radios stations since May 2014. The RJDH website provides to Central African citizens media content which has no competitors in the Central African internet press and print press for now.
The print press started to develop with the movement of democratization of French speaking African countries after the end of the Cold war in the early 1990s. However, it remained largely weak and unprofessional due to the:

- **Small size of the market**
  
  Most of Central African households cannot afford to pay daily 300 FCA (0.6 USD) for reading news. The advertisement market is very small: investment budgets are concentrated on radio. Investment in marketing focuses on events and branding.
  
  The economic sustainability of newspapers depends on the payment of fees to journalists or the media company to publish reports.

- **High production costs**
  
  There is no professional press printing company or offset printer. Newspapers are printed on basic printers then copied on photocopier. According to 2005 study, the cost per unit is 180 FCFA (0.36 USD). Salaries of journalists cannot be paid from the financial resources of the media company. Print press journalists are more subject to bribery than their radio counterparts or TV journalists.

- **Lack of competence of human resources**
  
  Since working for the print press puts one in a precarious situation, most of the competent journalists work for radio stations. Most of the journalists working for newspapers have no education in journalism.

- **Low quality politicized content**
  
  The easiest way of finding financial resources is to “sell” reports to politicians or to be supported by some politicians. Opinion journalism is the essence of the Central African print press. However, no newspaper has a clear editorial line except le Démocrate (close to the RDC, Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain). Most of the time, a politician supports a newspaper for a short period of time.

As the economic perspective of working in the print press is more than uncertain, the professional ambition of a large part of print press journalists is to be noticeable and known.

The aim is to be hired as the communication advisor to a powerful politician or in the communication department of a ministry or presidential press department (presse présidentielle).

The main daily newspapers are Le Citoyen (the Citizen) and Le Confident (the Confidant), which resemble small individual businesses in the way there are managed. Other main newspapers are published without having an office: l’Hirondelle (the Swallow), le Démocrate (the Democrat), le Peuple and Media Plus. However, the impact of the print press on public decision makers seems to remain important. Press reviews are also often included in news programs in the main radio stations.

The circulation of most of newspapers (between 100 and 1000 copies for Le Citoyen and Le Confident) is limited to downtown Bangui and targets opinion leaders.

Due to socio-economic conditions in the Central African Republic, information websites target educated people and the diaspora. Run by non-professional journalists, most of them are blogs that relay information and rumors. Only ACAP and RDJH produce high-quality content dedicated to an internet audience. Radio Ndeke Luka’s website also provides high-quality content related to reports and magazines produced by its journalists.
4.3 Media professionals organizations

The main media professional organizations (MPOs) have been structured in the last decade. UJCA (Union des Journalistes de Centrafrique - association of Central African journalists), OMCA, ARC-Centrafrique (Association des Radios Communautaires - Association of Community Radios - Central African Republic), MPJ (Maison de la Presse des Journalistes - Press and Journalists House in Bangui) and AFPC (Association des Femmes Professionnelles de la Communication - Association of Female Media Professionals) are the main MPOs. REMASTP/CA (Réseau des Médias Africains contre le Sida, la Tuberculose et le Paludisme, section de Centrafrique - African Media Network against Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria / Central African section) and RJDH (Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l’Homme - Association of Journalists for Human Rights) are associations of journalists producing independent high quality content. Most of these associations are still fragile because of they rely on one or two individuals, which have developed good competencies in project management.

Table 5: Main Media Professionals’ Organizations in the Central African Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UJCA</td>
<td>Union des Journalistes de Centrafrique - association of Central African journalists. UJCA is a mix of trade union and press freedom and defense organization. As the longer established MPO, UJCA has been a key element in the structuration of the media sector: OMCA and MPJ have been created from UJCA projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMCA</td>
<td>Observatory of Central African Media. Self-regulatory body (see page 18). <a href="http://omcarca.wordpress.com">http://omcarca.wordpress.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPJ</td>
<td>Maison de la Presse des Journalistes – Press and Journalists House. Provide office services to newspapers, training services and office to the main MPOs (UJCA, OMCA, AFPC and ARC-Centrafrique is willing to extend the building for locating its headquarters, studio and training center. <a href="http://mpjournalistes.wordpress.com">http://mpjournalistes.wordpress.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFPC</td>
<td>Association des Femmes Professionnelles de la Communication – Association of Women Media Professionals. Address gender issues in the media sector and discrimination against women in the society through action in the mass media. <a href="http://rcaafpc.wordpress.com">http://rcaafpc.wordpress.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REMASTP</td>
<td>Réseau des Médias Africains contre le Sida, la Tuberculose et le Paludisme, section de Centrafrique – African Media Network against Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria / Central African section. Health journalism with a focus on Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria. <a href="http://remastp.wordpress.com">http://remastp.wordpress.com</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For an history of the structuration of Central African MPOs, see Centrafrique : état des lieux du Secteur Médias, Pascal Chirhalwirwa, Simon Pierre N’Douba, Pierre Martinot, Institut Panos Europe, January 2014
5 Struggling with the crisis: the current situation of the media sector in the CAR

Security issues, looting and the severe decrease of advertisement income due to the conflict, affected all Central African media outlets in different ways. Since March 2013, the capacity of the production of media content is continuously decreasing.

5.1 Impact of security issues

Since the beginning of skirmishes and battles between the Seleka and the FACAs (Forces Armées Centrafricaines or Central African Forces) in the second half of 2012, insecurity spread throughout the entire country, impacting directly the work of Central African journalists.

Radio stations progressively closed throughout the country. Most of the radio stations still operating in rural areas are located in regions where problems of insecurity are limited (the western part of the country) or protected by international support, notably in the southeastern part of the country.

In conflict areas, journalists have limited access to victims, especially Muslim victims. As most of them are Christian, they have limited access to areas controlled by ex-Seleka, notably in the Western part of the country, where the tension is high (Bangui, Boda11).

Independent journalists are threatened, notably those working for Radio Ndeke Luka, which is considered the main independent media outlet. Seleka fighters also took position in Radio Centrafrique for several months in order to defend this strategic center of political power, but also to control the work of journalists working for the national broadcaster.

Journalists working for radio stations are particularly targeted by threats; because radio is the most popular media and radio journalists have to go out to the field to report.

5.2 Radios stations

Since the beginning of the conflict, pillages by Seleka fighters and then by the Anti-Balaka militiamen, led to the closure of nearly a third of the community radio stations throughout the country. Internews and OCHA issued a map presenting the situation of operations and coverage of Central African radio stations in March 2014. Since then, Radio ESCA and Radio Nehemie, an important protestant community radio broadcasting in FM from Bangui, temporarily suspended their operations in May 2014.

The only community radio station belonging to the Muslim community, Voix de la Paix (Voice of Peace) suspended its broadcasting operations in December 2013. However, media professionals expect the radio to resume broadcasting before the end of June, because the director of the community radio may come back from Kuwait by then.

Radio stations suffer from the decrease of advertising income. Most of them have been victims of looting since the beginning of the crisis. Their capacity of production has been severely reduced. As an example, Radio Centrafrique only broadcasts only up to 70% of its normal schedule.

Except Radio Ndeke Luka, programs are not always broadcast according to the schedule because of 1) the disorganization of production due the lack of human resources and the lack

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11 Hundreds of Muslims live in Boda (Lobaye) surrounded by Anti-Balaka militia.
of equipment and 2) the reduction of staff due to the lack of financial resources and the fact that some journalists leave to find better wages while working with international NGOs. This movement is common to every humanitarian emergency in countries characterized by a lack of educated human resources.

Map 1: Operational situation of Central African radio stations (as for March, 23rd 2014)

5.3 Print press and Internet

The print press suffered from the collapse of the advertisement market. The number of communiqués, non-advertised infomercial and reports taken from international media rose significantly since March 2013.

The conflict has had little impact on the Internet press since most of the publications are managed from abroad. However, information exchanges on social networks increased substantially since the beginning of the crisis in March 2013, notably on Facebook. It is now a significant source of information for Central African journalists. The development of Internet networks in the last few years made accessible this type of information to educated people in Bangui.

5.4 Media regulation

The transitional HCC (HCCT) has been the last transitional institution to be established by the government in May 2014. Jean Michel Pouambi, a former Radio Ndeke Luka journalist and former senior official in the Ministry of Communication, was elected president of the HCCT on May 26th. The Board was also established. The nine members were nominated on May 20th.
Amongst them, notably, are Pauline Guerengendo and Pierre Debato II, who were previously Radio Centrafrique’s General Manager and President of OMCA.

The HCC’s office near the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been devastated. The HCCT will not be able to operate any media monitoring for months. Renewing the equipment of the HCCT may not be one of the priorities of the transitional government. The HCCT has been established but may not have sufficient resources to reestablish media regulation. The institutional credibility of the previous HCC was already weak: absence of a reliable media monitoring system, absence of a publication of monitoring reports, lack of independence and lack of reactivity in cases of important violations, except in those of alleged defamation of pro-government politicians, the head of state or members of the government.

The weak institutional capacity of the self-regulatory body, OMCA, has not suffered from the current conflict. However, the Board did not react to violations of the regulations by the press.

The media regulation framework exists but is not currently capable of regulating the production of media content.
6 Main findings of OMCA specific media monitoring

The OMCA’s media monitoring team, with the technical assistance of Internews, monitored Central African media content from April 19th to May 18th, 2014.

6.1 Methodology

Internews reinforced the OMCA’s media monitoring capacities in collaboration with Institut Panos Europe with the objective of focusing on the treatment of news related to the current conflict by Central African journalists. Institut Panos Europe has supported the institutional capacity building processes of the self-regulatory body since 2012\(^\text{12}\). Internews’ objective was to make available a baseline study on the media content produced during the current sectarian conflict in order to design efficient intervention strategies for the actual emergency context.

Support the only media monitoring capacities operating in the Central African Republic

As the High Council for Communication matters (HCC) is no longer operational and the transitional HCC (HCCT) has not yet been established by the transitional authorities, the only media monitoring facilities available in the country were those of the OMCA’s media monitoring team. The OMCA’s media monitoring team was thus reinforced in human resources (3 additional staff to the 3 OMCA analysts) and in equipment.

Moreover, the OMCA is the sole self-regulatory body, a neutral media professionals’ organization. Its independence is not questioned.

The Code of Ethics published by OMCA includes provisions against hate speech, insults and defamation, which are criminal offenses in the Central African media regulation framework. The media law gives the OMCA the possibility to present these cases to the public media regulator. The media law recognizes its specific role in the media regulation framework.

This specific media monitoring has given the OMCA the opportunity to enhance its credibility amongst government, civil society and media professionals.

Targeted programs and media outlets

Six radio stations currently broadcasting from Bangui, four news and information websites and six daily newspapers have been monitored by a team of six analysts (three OMCA permanent staff and three analysts recruited for this operation). However, the OMCA’s media monitoring included all content that could present potential violations. If the title of an article in a non-targeted media hinted a possible violation, OMCA media monitoring checked the article.

Centrafrique Presse and Journal de Bangui websites were added to the list of targeted media from May 4th onwards. The OMCA’s media monitoring team considered that their impact on opinion leaders is important. However, the content taken from other websites and published on the latter was included in the sample to limit the volume of data.

\(^{12}\) Project MID (« Independent Media outlets for consolidating Democracy – Médias Indépendants pour consolider la Démocratie »), funded by France and the European Union.
## Media content in the Central African Republic crisis: an overview and solutions for further peace-building and governance interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Number of hours of programs monitored by the OMCA’s media monitoring team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio Centrafrique</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Ndeke Luka</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Notre Dame</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Nehemie</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linga FM</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio ESCA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (hours of produced radio content monitored by OMCA media monitoring team, not included repeats) :</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Print press/ Internet</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACAP (website)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l'Homme (RJDH)</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrafrique Presse – blog</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal de Bangui</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Confident</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Citoyen</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Hirondelle</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Peuple</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Agora</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Plus</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL :</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Articles and reports targeted by analysts are:

- All articles treating social and political subjects
- Radio: morning news, mid-day news, evening news
- Magazines, debates and talk-shows treating social and political subjects

During the monitoring period, 248 hours of news and information programs and 448 articles (print press and internet) have been analyzed by the OMCA’s media monitoring team. All this material has been archived.

In radio stations, most of the news content is produced in the morning and broadcasted in the mid-day news for the first time. Reports on important events happening later during the day are added in the evening news and later in the morning news.

Three questionnaires were designed (print press, news on radio and other radio programs) focusing on the treatment of the conflict by journalists, notably on:

- Notification and analysis of hate speech
- Notification of analysis of discriminating vocabulary
- Equal access of politicians and communities to media
- Conflict sensitivity in the treatment of information by journalists and peace journalism (research of solutions in conflict mitigation processes or focus on peace mitigation/building initiatives)

The figures presented in the findings have been calculated from the data entered by the OMCA’s media monitoring in the specific database. Another simpler questionnaire, along with its related database, was designed to support the establishment of a more efficient media monitoring system.

Results are presented for the print press and the content produced by radio stations.

**Limits of the media monitoring framework**

Except Radio Ndeke Luka, programs are not always broadcast according to the schedule: programs are therefore difficult to monitor. During the monitoring period, Linga FM did not resume producing news, magazines and debates. Radio ESCA tried to resume broadcasting news but the murder of one of its staff journalists stopped the process. The only radio station owned by the Muslim community (Radio Ama - Voix de la Paix) has not yet resumed broadcasting.

The sample does not include media outlets located outside Bangui, which proves a limit to assessing more comprehensively the CAR media environment, notably in regions where tensions between communities are important.

The six analysts of the OMCA media monitoring team are young journalists. An experienced coordinator, which is an analyst in the HCC media monitoring department, and an Internews expert managed and provided mentoring to the staff. All the analysts are radio journalists; the coordinator was a journalist working in the print press. The analysts were trained at radios stations in Bangui (Radio Ndeke Luka, Radio ESCA etc.). One of the young analysts was working at the same time for Radio Nehemie. However, no analysts were responsible for the monitoring of the content by a media outlet, which he had worked for.
Two specific training sessions were organized by Internews (an expert on conflict sensitive journalism and an expert in media monitoring). These workshops aimed to provide a definition of the different concepts used in the media monitoring framework and the harmonization of the understandings of each elements of the media monitoring questionnaire.

The Central African media sector is small. Generations of journalists built bonds of friendship and a small community where everyone knows each other. Muslim journalists, are rare. OMCA analysts are all Christian. However, their religious belief had no impact on their work.

This specific media monitoring has been announced by Internews to other international organizations working on media development in the CAR. Long standing friendships of each member of OMCA media monitoring team has also been a vector for this information to spread among the community of journalists in Bangui. The fact that journalists might know that OMCA and Internews were monitoring media content might have an impact on the findings presented in this report.

6.2 Findings on the production of news content by Central African media outlets

Data gathered by OMCA media monitoring team shows a focus on the production of news and information content (50% of official schedules in monitored radio stations) and gives information on the situation of gender in the Central African media sector.

Four weekly reports have been published by OMCA with the support of Internews and Institut Panos Europe during the period13.

Radio programs

In the six radio stations monitored during the one month period (April 19th - May 18th), news and information represented 40% of the content in the official schedule. Religious content represented 10% of the schedule, as most of the Central African radio stations have a confessional background. However, the part of religious programs in the radio stations which have a secular editorial line is comparable to that of the public broadcaster in an extremely secular country like France. Entertainment represents 50% of the schedule. Most of the entertainment content is made up of music or musical programs (49%) and sports (1%). Music is the most popular. The cost of production for this type of content is limited because most of radio stations are not paying rights to music producers. Sport and dramas are not numerous, because of their related cost of production. However, the rare humorous dramas are very popular.

13 These four weekly reports are available on OMCA website: http://omcarca.wordpress.com
Graph 1: Analysis of official schedules in the six radios stations broadcasting from Bangui

News represents 23% of the total schedule in the six radio stations monitored during the period. The situation of conflict had a direct influence on the subjects treated in news and information content with a focus 1) on the conflict (more than one third of news and information content) but not on grassroots conflict mitigation activities (2.6%) and 2) on politics (one third of news and information content). Security issues are the main subject related to the need of the population while social subjects (food security, health and education) did not seem to be a priority at the moment.
A focus on local and national news in media content produced by Central African media outlets

Central African media outlets focus on the role of provider of local and national news. International news is provided by international media outlets like Radio France Internationale, which is available on FM in Bangui and across the country on short wave.

Graph 3: Part of local, national and international news broadcast on Central African radio stations
Gender

The part of women journalists producing content is significantly different in the press print and in radio stations. Women represent 1% of the authors identified in reports that are non-related to entertainment (monitored by OMCA media monitoring team) in the print press. However, 17% of the authors of the reports have not been identified: a lot of reports are not signed or signed by an identifiable pseudonym (the pseudonym is often French or North American).

In radio stations, 38.4% of news and information content is produced by women: a high rate considering the discrimination against women in education and in enterprises in the Central African Republic. However, women being cited as the source of information in the reports are low. As sources are often public decision makers, politicians, business men or civil society leaders, media content reproduces social discrimination against women.

Graph 4: Sources in news and information content broadcast on Central African radio stations and in the print press

Magazines dedicated to gender issues represent less than 1% of the schedule. OMCA media monitoring framework does not provide data on gender sensitivity of media content produced by Central African journalists.

However, studies acknowledge the link between the number of women in management positions in a media outlet and gender sensitivity of the news and information content (correlation between the presence of women in management position and the number of women as sources of information). In neighboring countries, UCOFEM (Union Congolaise des Femmes de Médias - Congolese Association of Female Media Professionals), which monitors the place and the role of women in media content, established a distinction between the number of female media professionals and the number of female media managers. In the Central African Republic, few management positions are occupied by women. Like in many Central African countries, the situation is better in the public and associative sector than in the private sector. Community and associative radio stations have a significant number of

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14 For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, women journalists represent 25% of media professionals.
female journalists, even in rural areas. Radio stations that belong to the public (Radio Centrafrique) and the associative sector have a higher probability of hiring women than the print press, which are all commercial media outlets (expect ACAP and the RJDH). The status of Radio Ndeke Luka, which was directly run by Fondation Hirondelle and still is supported by the Swiss NGO through the Fondation Ndeke Luka, is unique. The radio station is officially a commercial media but its strategy focuses on the provision of public interest information. The two Central African main media outlets, Radio Centrafrique and Radio Ndeke Luka, have appointed women as general managers. However, no study or media monitoring focusing on gender issues is available to assess an impact on gender sensitivity in the media content produced by these media outlets.

6.3 Hate speech seems to be limited to print press

Hate speech and prejudice tend to reproduce and strengthen social images that reinforce the sectarian conflict as presented in Table 2: Sources of tension between Muslims and Christians in the CAR (page 15).

If the direct impact of the print press is limited by its poor distribution, its impact on opinion leaders remains important. Moreover, articles are also published on diaspora blogs and websites.

“Journalists working in the print press often write the stories that people just told him, too often”

Line Péguy GONDJE, OMCA analyst, journalist Radio Nehemie

Number and nature of hate speech cases

OMCA media monitoring registered six important violations which have been the subject of detailed reports to the OMCA Board (rapport circonstancié) for decision. In weekly reports, 21 cases have been identified. However, analysts registered in the database 74 elements of hate speeches in the print press and only 4 in media content broadcasted by radio stations.

16 Pauline Guerengendo was Radio Centrafrique general manager until her nomination to the Board of the HCC in May 2014. Sylvie Panika is Radio Ndeke Luka general manager.
Defamation

Most of the time, defamation targets the president, members of government, politicians officers of international forces. Defamation has only been registered in reports in the print press because the Central African print press cherishes opinion journalism more than the facts. The lack of professionalism and the way by which the print press is funded explains this tendency (see explanations to the existence of hate speech in the press print rather than in radio content, page 32.)
Assertions which are an incentive to violence

Most of the 78 cases of elements of hate speech can be included in the following semantic framework. OMCA media monitoring analysts classified 24% of these hate speech elements as assertions which are an incentive to violence. However, these types of assertions are most of the time correlated to a lack of identified and credible sources.

1 - Christians are the victims

“Slaughtered like sheeps”\textsuperscript{17}, “Christians are in a position of weakness, therefore they flee in IDP camps”\textsuperscript{18}, “nobody dares to lift one little finger to denounce atrocities against Central African citizens in remote areas”\textsuperscript{19}, are some of examples of expressions aiming to present the Christians as the only victims of the conflict. In the last example, the journalist suggests that all Central African citizens are Christian.

2 - Giving voice only to non-Muslim victims

Due to weak access to areas controlled by Seleka fighters and by empathy with members of their own community, journalists tend not to interview Muslim victims. Journalists also tend not to check information provided by Christian victims, even if most of the time it constitutes second hand information.

3 - Muslims are not real Central Africans and therefore invaders

“Force [the Central Africans] to flee and let their own country to invaders”\textsuperscript{20}, “Moussa Dhaffane…who describes himself as from Central African origin”\textsuperscript{21}, are expressions which deny the Central African nationality to the members of the Muslim community in the print press. “Real” Central Africans are Christian and they are the victims of Muslims invaders.

4 - Christians have to react

\textsuperscript{17} « Mort lente administrée aux chrétiens à partir du Km 5 », Le Quotidien de Bangui, 23rd April 2014
\textsuperscript{18} « les chrétiens sont en position de faiblesse, d’où leurs retraitements dans les sites de déplacés, en quête de sécurité pour leur vie », Le Christianisme a appauvi et rendu les chrétiens africains peureux, Le Peuple, 22nd April 2014
\textsuperscript{19} « personne n’ose lever le bout de pouce pour dénoncer les actes de barbarie contre les citoyens Centrafriquains de l’arrière-pays », Le Peuple, 29th April 2014
\textsuperscript{20} « conduire [les Centrafricains] à fuir […] pour laisser leur pays à des envahisseurs », Le Christianisme a appauvi et rendu les chrétiens africains peureux, Le Peuple, 22nd April 2014
\textsuperscript{21} « Moussa Mohamed Dhaffane … qui se dit Centrafrique de souche », La Seleka n’est pas impliqué dans les massacres de Naga-Boguila, dixit Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane, Media Plus, 29th April 2014
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“There is nothing to do but to consider revenge, regardless the way it will happen”, in the report “Seven elders found dead in the Fondo neighborhood”22, Le Confident, 29th April 2014

Hate speech presents Muslims like invaders and terrorists who want to “fight with all the Churches” (Le Citoyen/ The Citizen, 22nd April 2014) 23 which are supported by the international community (for example, “the last terrorist action of those criminals with the support of the unflappable Burundian contingent”24, Le Démocrate (The Democrat), 2nd May 2014). This leads to a call for Christians to find « solutions to our problems, at any price » (Le Peuple/The People, 29th April)25: a call to violent reactions from members of the Christian community.

Non explicit expressions discriminating a community

Non-explicit expressions discriminating a whole community are rare. However, the expression “victims were slaughtered like sheep” (“égorgés comme des moutons”in French) is often used by journalists for a purpose of victimization of Christians. Eating sheep is a Chadian and Northeastern food custom. This expression is used to target the Muslim community which is not distinguished from murderers or armed groups.

Ridicule or deriding an individual or a community

Ridicule and insults target belligerents and politicians alike, notably those in charge of the government, and exclusively on reports about the conflict or supposed inefficient governance in the security sector and public finance management processes.

“...hate of the Chadian government and its president Idriss Deby (included those scoundrels, rogues and bandits from the Seleka”, “the city of Bouca has been seized by that gang of thugs and association of highway robbers: the Seleka”26

Le Peuple (The People), daily newspaper, 22.04.2014

Insults are clearly considered as a way of expressing opinion. For example, an article in the daily newspaper Le Peuple in its April 28 edition, entitled: « Is Samba Panza losing ground?», includes an accumulation of deriding assertions close to insults: “women without any power”, “interference of buddies and rascals”, “comic” (describing her behavior), etc. without it being supported by any explaining elements.

“Chronic insecurity in the Kilometre 5: the Muslims strike once again in Fatima and Bazanga”

Title of an article published in le Démocrate (The Democrat), 2nd May edition

The amalgam between the Muslim community and Seleka fighters is often presented as a fact and the reason why Christians must react. The expression “sujets musulmans” (which can be translated as Muslim individuals) is equivalent to “Seleka fighters” and “Muslim bandits”. Most of the time, the aggressors are only identified by victims and the information is not checked with other elements (second hand information). Muslim fighters are also described as “Islamists” or “terrorists”.

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22 “Sept vieillards trouvés morts au quartier Fondo » in French
24 « le dernier acte terroriste de ses criminels, appuyés par l’inoxydable troupe burundaise » in French, in L’insécurité chronique au Km5 : les musulmans ont encore frappé à Fatima et à Bazanga , Le Démocrate, 2nd May 2014
25 « solutions à nos problèmes, à n’importe quel prix » in French
26 « la haine du gouvernement Tchadien et de son président Idriss Deby (y compris ces bandes de voyous et coupeur de route de la Seleka », « la ville de Bouca est prise la semaine passée par les bandes de voyous et association de bandits de grand chemin de la Seleka »
Threats

The threats registered by the OMCA media monitoring team are not numerous and have not been written by Central African print press journalists. Newspapers publish press releases issued by armed groups and reports from international media outlets.

Press releases published by belligerents are published by newspapers without any precautions. Some of the press releases included threats that could lead to violent reactions from members of the antagonist community. The dilemma for these newspapers is related to the financial bottom line: should the media outlets renounce to income sources which may be crucial for their survival or should journalists treat the press releases only as sources of information? The OMCA’s analysts reported on the publishing of Nourredine Adam’s press release in Le Confident (daily newspaper, April 23rd): the press release included threats that could lead to violent reactions from members of the Christian community. Media Plus (daily newspaper, April 22nd)27 published a Reuters’ report which included Anti-Balaka’s hate speech without analysis or putting them in perspective for the Central African public. These quotes could have led to violent reactions from the Muslim community or be used in Christian extremists’ propaganda.

« Copy-and-Paste reports taken from international media outlets are published nearly every day in Central African newspapers »

Florentin MBISSOUNGOU, OMCA analyst

Dehumanization of members of a community

The OMCA’s media monitoring team registered few elements of the dehumanization of community members. These elements are always explained by unfortunate humor: the author wants to talk like common people but the listener is not enabled to know if it is irony or not. As an example, a short comedy sketch was broadcast on Radio Notre Dame on April 26th. In the drama, comedians used a popular expression describing members of the Gula ethnic group (North East CAR)28 as smoked meat (viande boucanée29 in French). The OMCA’s media analyst were not able to establish irony (if the comedians were mocking the people who use this type of expression or not). This type of program is not monitored by OMCA media monitoring team because the OMCA’s mandate is centered on ethics of journalists as media professionals and not on the enforcement of media content regulations which is the institutional role of the public media regulator (Haut Conseil de la Communication / High Council of Communication - HCC). However, this shows a lack of sensitivity in the current situation of sectarian conflict.

Lack of professionalism and opinion journalism

There is a quasi-absence of hate speech in radio content but some biases are present in the treatment of news and information by radio journalists

Only four elements of hate speech have been registered by the OMCA’s media monitoring team in radio content. However, elements of bias in the treatment of information related to the conflict have been noticed by analysts, demonstrating of a lack sensitivity to the conflict in the treatment of information (see paragraph 3.4 page 34).

27 « En Centrafrique, les musulmans en état de siège »
28 Most of Seleka fighters come from North Eastern CAR
29 Specific technique of smoking game meat, used in the CAR
The issue of sources

The lack of professionalism in the production of news and information content by Central African journalists is characterized by the presence of the unsubstantiated statements, notably in the print press, due to the lack of credible sources and cross-check of information. Only 47.8% of the sources identified in the reports published in the print press are considered like credible by the OMCA’s media monitoring team. Due to the more inclusive character of the radio content, the OMCA’s analysts consider that they are not able to assess the credibility of 43.8% of sources. However, 92.8% of those sources for which they can assess credibility are considered like credible in radio stations.

“This leads to the feeling that journalism in the print press is not a serious business”

Blandin SONGUEL, coordinator media monitoring – OMCA, analyst - HCC

In the print press, the lack of credibility is equally explained by the use of unchecked second hand sources (33.7%), non-identified sources (38.9%) and sources for which the scale of expertise is not related with the subject enough (27.4%). For radio content, the lack of credibility of sources is caused by the use of unchecked second hand sources (69.8%), mostly from people who are close to Christian victims, and non-identified sources (30.2%).

« There is no investigation journalism because there is no funding for this »

Line Péguy GONDJE, OMCA analyst, journalist Radio Nehemie

Checking and investigating sources are costly operations. Print press media outlets cannot afford to pay journalists for investigating. The cheapest way of producing content is to report from second hand sources.

Opinion journalism and lack of professionalism in the print press

« Even on Radio Centrafrique, journalists sometimes give their feelings or their opinions »

Florentin MBISSOUNGOU, OMCA analyst

« Even on Radio Ndeke Luka, it may happen that journalists begin the report with comments »

Archange MAFOUTA-MOKOLA, OMCA analyst

Giving his/her opinion is the sweet temptation of Central African journalists. However, radio journalists tend to be less subject to this sin than their print press colleagues. Opinion journalism is not a sin, but becomes one if the journalist does not follow professional rules. The OMCA’s media monitoring data shows that 77.6% of reports published in the print press present a bias (content related to politics and coverage of conflict), against 1.3% for radio news and information content. Print press journalists often use unsubstantiated assertions and elements to demonstrate their argument.

The Central African print press is an opinion press. Only 23.2% of the content monitored in the print press does not include comments, against 95.3% in the radio content. Central African newspapers are not sustainable: journalists and managers are subject to bribery and the sale of political communication services. The aim of journalists seems therefore to prove their influence with the objective to be chosen for the next communication initiative by a politician. The use of emotional vocabulary is therefore a strong trend in the Central African print press and there is an incentive to sensationalism. Some journalists use the influence that the print press exerts on opinion leaders to ask for money to stop harassing a public decision maker or a politician after the publication of an accusatory or defamatory report.
“Sometimes the print press business makes me think to extortion”

Blandin SONGUEL, coordinator media monitoring – OMCA, analyst - HCC

The general lack of professionalism in the print press is also partly due to the lack of resources invested in local journalism education and the lack of media regulation. The Department of Journalism and Communication at the University of Bangui was only recently established in 2011 with the support of UNESCO and Institut Panos Paris. The media regulation framework includes a specific status for professional journalists. Each journalist is supposed to be registered with a professional organization which delivers a document certifying the journalist’s professional status (national press card, “carte de presse” in French). However, Central African MPOs have not been able to deliver the document for more than 15 years. Most of the journalists did not receive any training and have not been managed by a more experienced and trained journalist.

The media regulation framework is not able to limit the publication and broadcasting of poor quality news and information contents, leading to a feeling of impunity amongst the journalists in case of violations of the Code of Ethics. Moreover, journalists can publish under pseudonyms in the print press or on internet.

“Too many journalists signing reports in the print press are not identifiable. This facilitates abuses.”

Line Péguy GONDJE, OMCA analyst, journalist Radio Nehemie

On the 13th of May, nonprofessional journalism behaviors are expected to grow with the proximity of forthcoming elections forecast for February 2015. Some newspapers try to promote ethical behavior amongst their journalists during conflicts, but such attempts are tantamount to preaching in the desert because of the current business model and the scarcity of income generating opportunities.

“ I noticed that l’Hirondelle et le Citoyen were making efforts to stick to professional ethics ”

Estelle Carine MAZOUNOKO, OMCA analyst
Lack of professionalism in the print press and sectarian conflict: an example

On May 13th, Le Démocrate, a daily newspaper, published an article on sectarian violence in Km5, the last Muslim enclave in Bangui. The article titled: “Dix grands criminels musulmans arrêtés et transférés à Ngaragba” (“Ten serious Muslim criminals under arrest and transferred to Ngaragba” – the central prison in Bangui), mentioned that “ten Muslim extremists” had been arrested including “eight Muslim Chadians, one individual from the Democratic Republic of Congo and a Muslim Central African”. The article was signed by the “editorial office” (“la rédaction” in French). The newspaper announced that these individuals were “activists from the Muslim extremist group Boko Haram, which is establishing a base in Bangui” and promised further developments in the forthcoming articles.

The article was published on the front page along with a photo depicting religious leaders of the Km5 Muslim community, instead of the alleged terrorists as referred in the article.

On Friday, May 16th, the newspaper issued a correction partly admitting its mistake. In the correction titled “Erratum and publication under threat” the newspaper reaffirmed "its engagement to the utmost respect of authorities and human beings. The picture is obviously not representing the real alleged criminals detained at Ngaragba. The [newspaper] regrets the inconvenience caused by the publication of this picture."

Five weeks earlier, on April 30th, a journalist working for le Démocrate was allegedly killed by Muslim bandits or fighters in a district of Bangui neighboring Km5. This killing and the fatal assault of a journalist working for Radio ESCA on the same day led to serious protests from media professionals on May 7th (no publication of newspapers, demonstration in front of the office of the UN peacekeeping mission).

6.4 A dangerous lack of conflict sensitivity in the treatment of news

More than 95% of the news and information content broadcasted on Central African radio stations do not include comments. The OMCA’s media monitoring data acknowledges that 89.7% of the witnesses and/or individuals interviewed in radio reports are considered credible (against 46.7% in the print press).
The editorial line of most Central African media outlets is not related to political or armed group movements because most of the radio stations are associative, and often a spin-off of religious associations. Newspapers have most of the time an opportunistic strategy: politicians provide financial resources for a short period time or to see specific contents published. However, data gathered by the OMCA media monitoring team shows a bias in the treatment of information related to the conflict as well as in the news related to politics in radio content through the analysis of access to media. The government benefits from a privileged access to media.

Newspapers give the media privileged access to government and pro-government factions. This privileged access seems to be correlated to the fact that the government is a major source of information (people interviewed) and that its comments on the security situation are requested by journalists. Access to media through the print press is buyable. This therefore ensures a relatively equal access of political actors to media in the print press, except for members of the political opposition smaller parties who cannot afford to pay for accessing to media. However, the transitional government includes politicians from most of the political parties and armed groups. The political opposition to the transitional government is by nature limited and focused on the design of the Constitution, nominations and security issues. The print press is also characterized by the lack of inclusiveness of its content (focus on politics): citizen and civil society organizations have a weak access to media in the print press. As the print press only targets opinion leaders and public decision makers in Bangui, the civil society therefore has a weaker access to the public debate.
Graph 7 Political bias - political actors - print press

- Pro Government: 62.3%
- Seleka or close to Seleka: 14.3%
- Pro Opposition: 14.3%
- Anti-Balaka or close to Anti-Balakas: 9.1%

Graph 8 Access to media - political actors (sources of information) - print press

- Academics
- Government: 23%
- Pro-government politicians
- Pro-opposition politicians
- Civil society leaders
- Media professionals
- Diplomats
- Religious leaders - Christian
- Religious leaders - Muslim
- Citizens - Christian
- Citizens - Muslim
- Leaders/Fighters - Anti-Balakas
- Leaders/Fighters - Seleka

Access to media by political actors (sources of information) in the Central African Republic crisis.
Radio content provides the media with important access to the civil society (civil society, religious leaders and media professionals). Politically biased radio reports are rare: 94.5% of radio content is considered like “not including political opinion” while 98.7% of radio content is considered “not biased in the treatment of information”. When biased, radio reports supports government (66.7%), opposition (11.1%) and Anti-Balakas views (22.2%).
The journalists tend to only give voice to Christian victims through second hand sources

Radio journalists tend to give more credit to members of the Christian community (Table 6). The main sources of information about the conflict are the victims. However, journalists declare to have weak access to victims, due to the poor financial resources of media outlets (transportation and telecommunications are expensive), the lack of sources of information in rural areas and security issues (notably in areas controlled by the Seleka). The Christian religious leaders (17.2% of the sources of information in reports) are identified as the most credible and reliable source of information and the most accessible as well. The access to media for both belligerents and antagonist communities is not equal in radio content.

Table 6: Source of information/interviews in reports broadcast on radio stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Christian/Anti-Balakas</th>
<th>Muslim/Selekas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters/Leaders</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In reports about interreligious peace initiatives, interviews with Muslim religious leaders are often missing while those of Catholic and Protestant leaders are always present.

Journalists explain this lack of equilibrium by security issues: most of them are Christian and feel like they have little secure access to areas controlled by Seleka fighters. Moreover, community radio stations often have a Christian confessional background, which explains that they offer a privileged access to Christian religious leaders to media. Journalists tend not to cross check the information that is provided by victims to Christian religious leaders.

Due to the focus of Christian victims as a major source of information on the conflict, journalists tend to use the vocabulary used by these victims, hence strengthening the amalgam between Muslim bandits, Seleka fighters and the whole Muslim community.

Lack of capacities in the treatment of information in a sensitive context

The biases in the treatment of information related to the conflict by radio journalists do not appear to be the results of propagandistic ambitions, but rather the outcome of their empathy towards accessible victims. The lack of sensitivity to conflict in the treatment of information is characterized by the:

- Lack of knowledge of the impact of media content in a conflict
- Bias in the treatment: victims are Christian and Christian leaders are the only initiators in conflict mitigation processes
- Conflict mitigation efforts are treated like events: the treatment is often similar to the treatment of political press conferences, with a lack of investigation on the context in which declarations are made
- Absence of information on the causes of conflict and the solutions that could discussed at local and national levels: the content do not enhance inclusive debate on conflict mitigation or peace building processes
Lack of knowledge of the impact of media content in a conflict

In the print press, the publication of articles edited for the foreign public in the international press may lead to misunderstandings and violence in a country where media literacy remains weak. In its 12th May edition, L’Hirondelle published a report edited by Anadolu Agency, a Turkish press agency. The report, “Ndele, congress of the heads of the Seleka appointed Joseph Ndeko as Chief of Staff” (“Ndele, le congrès des chefs de la Séléka désigne Jospeh Ndeko, Chef d’Etat Major” in French) describes the partition as inevitable and characterized all political actors by their presumed religious belief, except the Christian Joseph Ndeko, the new Chief of Staff of the “Muslim militia Seleka”. The report also gives the impression that the Christian side includes the government. In the current context, these affirmations seem to lend credence to allegations and rumors against the Muslim community suspected to push for partition.

Press releases from armed groups are published without any precautions in the layout or any warning. As an example, le Confident (The Confident) in its April 23rd edition published a Nourredine Adam press release, which included threats, without any warning and additional elements of context.

A short comedy sketch was broadcast on Radio Notre Dame on the April 26th. In the drama, comedians used a popular expression describing members of the Gula ethnic group (North East CAR) as smoke meat (viande boucanée in French – see 3.3 page 36).

Most of the radio content does not address the causes of the conflict nor conflict resolution solutions

Most of radio reports or debates do not address the causes of the conflict nor conflict resolution solutions (respectively 2.67% and 6.9% of the total news and information radio content). Opinion journalism in the print press tends to give more explanations of the cause of the sectarian conflict and discuss solutions (respectively 12.5% and 21.3% of the total news and information in the print press). The presence of radical solutions (“Muslims must leave the Central African Republic”) is significant (19.2%) in the print press due to a more important occurrence of elements of hate speech.

Table 7: Presence of explanations of the cause of the conflict and news and information about the research of solutions to the conflict in news and information media content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>Print Press</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanations of the cause of the conflict</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News and information about the research of solutions to the conflict</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the print press is linked to political interests, the discussion about the way to end the conflict focuses on the political process (47.6%). Most of the radio stations are community radio stations. Grassroots solutions including the civil society at a local level and initiatives including the civil society, notably religious leaders, are presented like the main solution to the conflict in radio news and information content (41%). Due to security issues, the solution of “rearmament of the FACA and support from international forces” is heavily discussed in

30 A large part of Séléka fighters come from North Eastern CAR
31 Specific technique of smoking game meat, used in the CAR
radio programs (more than 30% of the elements of discussions in radio news and information content).

Graph 11: Solutions to the conflict in news and information media content

The question of the basic needs of the population is focused on security issues

The absence of elements of information for an inclusive debate on conflict mitigation/resolution solutions is important in radio: the question of the needs of the population is included in 58.4% of news and information content (against 21.8% in the print press). As opinion journalism is the essence of the Central African print press, journalists tend to analyze events - but most of time without presenting arguments based on substantial facts - and express political opinions about what should be done.

Security is the main preoccupation of the population discussed in news and information content (72.6% in radio content) due to the conflict situation. However, issues of social basic needs are less discussed in radio content than in the print press although radio is the only popular media. Elements of information on the social causes and consequences are not provided to most of the citizens and the focus is exclusively made on security issues. The “rearmament of the FACA with the support of international forces” represents more than 30% of the solutions discussed in news and information programs. The expression of basic social needs by citizens, the government and humanitarian responses to these demands are a central element of peace building processes. In a context of a collapsed state, humanitarian needs and interventions are therefore a key element in the peace building processes.
Graph 12: Social basic needs in news and information content

- Radio
  - Security: 11.3%
  - Food security: 8.1%
  - Health: 6.5%
  - Education: 1.6%
  - Justice: 72.6%

- Print press
  - Security: 14.8%
  - Food security: 9.4%
  - Health: 10.2%
  - Education: 13.3%
  - Justice: 52.3%
7 Recommendations

Violence continues to spread throughout the country. The partition of the country is a hypothesis that all actors seem to refuse, but in the meantime, the Western part of the country continues to be emptied of its Muslim communities. Muslims ask for relocation in the Northern part of the country in areas controlled by the Seleka militia. The general elections are forecast for February 2015.

Recommendations presented in this document are designed for an emergency intervention on the media sector with the following objectives:

- Contribute to limit violence
- Contribute to conflict mitigation and peace building efforts
- Accountability of the transitional process, notably the 2015 electoral process

7.1 What are the main issues to address in a short term perspective

According to the findings of this specific media monitoring data analysis, the work of journalists is not contributing enough to limit violence, to mitigate the conflict by treating issues leading to violence between communities (land conflicts in rural areas, public resource management etc.) nor to support the transitional process.

Media are not contributing enough to limit violence

The main issue currently is not so much hate speech as the lack of conflict sensitivity in the treatment of information by journalists. The main explanation given by members of Central African MPOs to the biases noticed by the OMCA’s media monitoring is that security issues are limiting access to Muslim victims and areas controlled by Seleka militia. Central African media outlets do not have the resources to send journalists in rural areas or to hire correspondents.

“Most of journalists have no means to go and get information in the rural areas controlled by the ex-Seleka because media outlets are poor and of course... no one wants to be killed”

Archange Mafouta, OMCA media analyst

To limit the biases resulting from the focus put on Christian victims, the solution is to enhance access to multiple sources for journalists throughout the country and address security issues.

The only solution to limit hate speech in the print press is to reinforce the media regulation bodies and enable them to sanction journalists and media who are found guilty of producing such types of content. Although the main legal text remains provisory (Ordinance 05.2005), the Central African media law enables media regulatory bodies and the government (provision of the penal code) to ban these behaviors.

Media are not contributing enough to the research of solutions to the conflict

Central African media outlets treat peace building efforts, and notably those conducted by religious leaders and the transitional government. However, the treatment can be biased: if the Muslim leader is not interviewed, the listener may have the impression that peace efforts are only conducted by Christian religious leaders. As the debate on conflict mitigation solutions are absent from the media content produced by Central African media outlets,
listeners and readers are only exposed to content describing those types of exactions of which Christian are victims (bias in the overall treatment of conflict by Central African media).

Reports, magazines and debates on the causes and solutions to the sectarian conflict are very rare.

Media are not contributing enough to the inclusion of Central African citizens in the transitional process

The content produced by Central African media outlets is characterized by the lack of investigation (lack of identified and credible sources, weak access to sources) and the absence of investigative journalism. The legitimacy and credibility of the new transitional institution is a key element in the peace building process, notably in the designation of the new government.

The watchdog role of Central African media outlets in the accountability processes is weak. The content produced by journalists is focused on political games and on social events or the treatment of the conflict. In the press print, journalists expressed directly their opinion, which may be the same as public opinion. However, as the informative content is not inclusive enough (except on social subjects), the democratic debate, notably on political solutions to mitigate the conflict or on the discussions about institution building, is weak.

7.2 Recommendations for further intervention

The following recommendations have been designed with the objective of:

- Reinforce media regulation to prevent hate and discriminatory speeches
- Capacity building in conflict-sensitive journalism
- Enhance production of media content that helps promote peace, addressing causes of the conflict (struggle for resources, failure of state and its institutions, failure of non-violent processes of designation of public decision makers).

The collaboration of media actors with humanitarian actors, institutions supporting democracy in the Central African Republic (HCCT, ANE) and civil society organizations could enhance the positive role that the Central African media sector could play in the peace building process (Table 6).
Scheme 1: Emergency intervention framework in the Central African media sector

Table 7: Positive role of media in peace building and transitional processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media as Watchdog/Information providers</th>
<th>Objective:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliver credible and reliable information</td>
<td>Support the production of credible and reliable information on the conflict and on peace building process including the transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: Fighting rumors, Avoid bias in the treatment of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver conflict sensitive information (notably treating all the aspect of the sectarian conflict)</td>
<td>Support capacity building on conflict sensitive journalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to the production of conflict sensitive information content by Central African journalists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: Media content helps citizens to get a better understanding of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media content is a vector of discriminating social stereotypes that explain some violent behaviors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On governance and institutional building by the transitional government (accountability and credibility of the democratic transition)</td>
<td>Training on investigative journalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to the production of information on governance issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: Improve transparency and accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhance credibility in the transitional process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the organization of the electoral process (accountability of the Electoral Management Body and credibility of the 2015 electoral process)  
Support the capacity building process of journalists on the electoral process and electoral coverage  
**Objective:**  
Improve transparency and accountability in the management of the electoral process by the National Authority for Elections, the Central African Electoral Management body.  
Enhance credibility of the electoral process

### Media as a place of democratic debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Media as Agenda setter of the democratic debate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Give voice to both communities and the most vulnerable</td>
<td>Support to electoral and civic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective: Include the most vulnerable to the democratic debate and peace building processes</td>
<td>Increase inclusive and informed participation of citizens, notably women and the most vulnerable, to the peace process and democratic transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give access to media to people and organizations engaged peace building or conflict mitigation processes</td>
<td>Focus the democratic debate on finding solutions to the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective: Promote peace through inclusive debate (citizen participation to peace building processes)</td>
<td>Promote peace journalism and inclusive debate, notably by enhancing women’s participation in peace building solutions (including socio-economic causes of conflict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give access to media to the people and organizations that promote reconciliation</td>
<td>Focus the democratic debate on the provision of emergency public action (transitional government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective: Promote reconciliation through inclusive debate (citizen participation in reconciliation processes including</td>
<td>Enhancing accountability of the government as socio-economic issues are also causes of the current sectarian conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | Objective:  
Start to address governance issues and strengthen credibility of transitional government and institutions by enhancing civic participation, notably including the most vulnerable |
| Give access to media to people and organizations engaged peace building or conflict mitigation processes | Focus the democratic debate on institutional building processes |
| Objective:  
Promote peace through inclusive debate (citizen participation to peace building processes) | Enhancing accountability of the government in the state rebuilding with a focus on the forthcoming electoral process |
| | Objective:  
Address political issues of the current conflict by enhancing civic participation, notably including the most vulnerable. |

### Identified tools for interventions

Considering the current humanitarian and political emergency as well as the agenda related to the electoral process, methods and tools that are able to rapidly deliver results have been chosen. These choices are most of the time explained by the efficiency of the tools and methods used in prior projects implemented in the Central African Republic or in similar context (neighboring countries).

**Training and mentoring methods**
Due to the emergency, the most reliable method for rapidly strengthening the capacities of Central African journalists might be a mix of hands-on training sessions and mentoring in the production of media content. The objective is to produce conflict sensitive content that promotes peace as soon as the support begins.

Correspondents in rural areas

The problem of the poorly identified sources and unchecked information is the main issue that was identified as a violation of the code of ethics by the OMCA’s media monitoring team.

The production of inclusive content requires being able to produce content in all parts of the country (areas controlled by the Seleka and areas controlled by Anti-Balakas militia). Existing networks of correspondents (RJDH, Radio Ndeke Luka, Radio Rurale correspondents and ARC-Centrafrique temporary capacity of mobilizing journalists working in community radios) in rural areas need to be reinforced with the objective of enabling Central African media outlets to obtain more abundant and reliable information from all the regions and communities.

Collaborative ways of production of media content

As security remains an issue, collaboration between media outlets is a way to enable journalists to work independently and deliver high quality information. The “synergy” method, developed in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea has been used by ARC-Centrafrique in the Central African Republic since 2010: First, journalists in member community radios and partner media outlets produce reports and information on a subject; then a central coordination desk in Bangui produces magazines, talk-shows and news from these reports; and finally, the program is broadcasted simultaneously in all partnered media outlets. ARC-Centrafrique was able to organize a “synergy” to cover the polling day in December 2010. Central African newspapers used the same method in an electoral education/information purpose and edited the Journal des Elections during the 2010/2011 electoral process. The impact of these programs represented a protection for journalists, notably in the practice of investigative journalism.

Associations of journalists producing content are also collaborating with journalists located outside Bangui and are therefore developing agreements for collaborative production. AFPC and RJDH already developed these types of agreements.

Work with independent institutions that support democracy (ANE and HCCT) and the civil society

The quality of information produced about the needs of the population or governance processes can be enhanced through the development of the collaboration between media and civil society organizations (access to media, provision of information to journalists). The cooperation with ANE could facilitate the coverage of the electoral process by journalists and ensure the credibility of the organization of the 2015 general elections.

The efficiency of the regulation of the media sector can be also strengthened by cooperation between MPOs, notably the OMCA, and the public media regulator (HCCT).

Supporting Central African MPOs

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32 Radio Ndeke Luka often participated to « synergies »
33 http://www.journal-des-elections.net
34 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, six provincial networks of community radios developed a magazine dedicated to investigative journalism which has broadcast from 2008 to 2013.
35 With ARC-Centrafrique in 2010 and 2011
36 Since 2011
37 Agence Nationale des Elections, the Central African electoral management body
38 Haut Conseil de la Communication de transition : transitional public media regulator
Support and mentor Central African journalists in the production of conflict sensitive content

Radio journalists’ lack of conflict sensitivity is the main structural issue, considering the impact of radio amongst populations.

R.1. Train and mentor journalists on conflict sensitive journalism (hands-on training sessions)
Trainings sessions should target radio/TV journalists and print press journalists. The advantage of hands-on trainings is that you may begin to mentor during the first training sessions and then start supporting production of high quality conflict sensitive content.

R.2. Support the production of conflict sensitive information content in covering all the country
The production of conflict sensitive information, notably in rural areas, needs to be reinforced, as most of the news published and broadcasted in Bangui only concern events that happen in the capital city. Collaborative ways of producing media content and networks of correspondents must be reinforced.

R.3 Promote the production of information on basic needs of the population (humanitarian news and information, news on security issues)
The causes of conflict are not only religious. News and information produced by Central African media outlets do not cover enough socio-economic subjects related to the basic needs of the population.

Journalists and MPOs can collaborate with humanitarian organizations to support the production of reliable information on the needs of the population and what is done to address these issues by the humanitarian community and the government (notably on security issues).

Support the media regulation bodies

R.4 Support the establishment of a specific emergency media monitoring system
In a context of sectarian violence, the registration, disciplinary penalties and prevention of hate speech and discriminating ideas in media content constitutes an urgent priority. Besides supporting the institutional capacity building, the media regulation bodies (HCCT and OMCA) need to be rapidly equipped and funded to monitor violations throughout the country.

The development of alternative solutions to the deployment of media monitoring capacity in rural areas is crucial due to the structural weakness of the two media regulation bodies. Collaborative with the civil society organizations and/or the development of a call center dedicated are effective alternative solutions that could be rapidly deployed.

R.5 Enhance technical capacities in media regulation

Technical capacities in media monitoring remains weak in both media regulation bodies.

R.6 Support the institutional building process (public media regulator)
The HCCT is the transitional media regulator. However, its mandate is challenging (prevention of hate speech in the media, regulation of the first post-conflict electoral campaign). The HCCT currently has no equipment and the capacities of its staff (media monitoring and legal department) are weak. The transitional institutions will also have to design the regulation framework for the forthcoming electoral campaign.

Support the development of an inclusive democratic debate that includes the research of peace and institutional solutions to prevent and mitigate conflicts in a sustainable way

R.7 Support the production of debates or content that enhances the debate with focus on causes and solutions to the conflict
The objective is to support peace building processes through the enhancement of citizen participation (men and women) to the research of solutions and participation to political processes through the actions of the civil society. The participation of leaders of the civil society and public decision makers at the local and national levels is therefore crucial.

Through the promotion of peace journalism and the production of conflict sensitive content, Central African citizens will be better informed and better equipped to participate in these processes.

Collaborative methods of production can be used to reinforce the regional and national impact of these debates.

R.8 Enhance collaboration between media, civil society and international organizations that support peace building, social cohesion and institutional building processes

The objective is to enhance accountability of community leaders, civil society organizations and public decision makers towards citizens.

R.9 Promote peace journalism

The promotion of peace journalism through trainings and support to production activities will help Central African journalists to treat all the information related to the peace building processes and not only the news related to the political process or events related to the conflict.

Enhance accountability of the transitional institutions

R.10 Enhance accountability and transparency processes during the phases of reform and redeployment of security forces

Media can help to enhance accountability and transparency processes during the phases of reform and redeployment of security forces by:

- Improving media access to spokespersons from security forces
- Reinforcing the capacity of treatment of related information by journalists (reports and debates)
- Reinforcing the capacity of local journalists in accomplishing investigative journalism (watchdog role of media)

R.11 Enhance accountability and transparency for transitional government actions

Media can help to enhance the accountability and transparency processes of the transitional government actions by:

- Reinforcing the capacity of treatment of related information (governance) by journalists (reports and debates)
- Reinforcing the capacity of local journalists in accomplishing investigative journalism (watchdog role of media)

R.12 Promote and support investigative journalism

To be able to play their role of watchdog and reliable places for the democratic debate, journalists have to be able to investigate. Capacities in investigative journalism have to be enhanced. Security and press freedom issues can be addressed through the use of collaborative ways of producing investigative content.

R.13 Promote women participation in modifying its social image through the media
An assessment of gender issues in the media sector is needed to evaluate to what extent the media can change the image of women in the Central African Republic (women participation to peace and political processes) through specific media monitoring and the inclusion of women in media enterprises, notably in management position, through the support of AFPC and other women organizations working on gender issues.

Enhance the credibility of the electoral process, as part of the peace building process

R.14 Support electoral education activities through the media

Media may cooperate with civil organizations working on civic education and the electoral management body (ANE) to support electoral activities.

R.15 Support capacity building for electoral coverage

Trainings to improve electoral coverage should include workshops on the legal framework of the electoral process and specific hands-on training on electoral coverage.

R.16 Enhance accountability and transparency of the electoral operations through media

The objective is to strengthen the independent coverage of the forthcoming electoral process through the support of the production of reliable and independent electoral information, notably through collaborative production ("synergies").
8 Annex

8.1 Examples of the OMCA’s media monitoring analysis framework document: radio news and information programs

**FORMULATION PAR EMISSION CIBLEE – RADIO/TV**

OMCA République Centrafricaine – Avril 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analyste Monitoring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO/TV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 DATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 HEURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Présentateur/animateur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Sexe du présentateur/animateur</td>
<td>Both, Female, Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 PROGRAMME</td>
<td>Magazine, Emission à telephone ouvert, Emission de débat, Tranche du matin, Hors heure de grande écoute, Tranche Prime-time (et avant prime time)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1.7 LOCALISATION DU/DES SUJETS TRAITÉS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actualités africaines</td>
<td>Actualités internationales</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Donner la localisation géographique exacte du/des sujets traités :

### 1.8 SUJETS TRAITÉS DANS L’EMISSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Les institutions et l’ordre constitutionnel</th>
<th>Politique et les futures élections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Les questions de sécurité</td>
<td>Affrontements entre belligerants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les exactions dues aux conflits communautaires (sans mise en perspective)</td>
<td>Les questions communautaires et la cohésion nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réconciliation/Actions positives</td>
<td>Situation des personnes déplacés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions de vie des populations</td>
<td>Les questions de sécurité alimentaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’économie et les revenus des ménages</td>
<td>Santé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Etat de droit (hors questions liées sécurité)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santé</td>
<td>Communauté internationale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2.1 Fonction des interviewés et des intervenants (sources):

Universitaires
Gouvernement
Politiciens pro-gouvernement de transition
Politiciens critiques à l’égard du gouvernement de transition
Leaders de la société civile
Diplomates
Leaders religieux – chrétiens
Leaders religieux musulmans
Citoyens dans la rue – chrétiens
Citoyens dans la rue – musulmans
Responsables miliciens Séléka
Responsables miliciens Anti Balaka

(pour les leaders antibalakas et Séléka, préciser lorsque les stéréotypes sont bousculés, par exemple, si le leader Séléka est chrétien ou que le leader antibalaka est musulman)

### 2.2 Genre des sources

NA
Hommes
Femmes
Les deux (préciser le nombre de sources hommes et de sources femmes)

### 2.3 Identification des sources

Oui
NON
Sources anonymes

### 2.4 Crédibilité des sources

Oui
NON
(Expliquer pourquoi)
2.5 La source est-elle un témoin direct ou une partie prenante informée par rapport à la question traitée?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>NON</th>
<th>(Expliquer pourquoi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2.6 L’émission présente-t-elle différents points de vue (pro-gouvernement, anti-gouvernement ou encore proche des Sélékas / proche des vues des antibalakas) ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Pro-gouvernement</th>
<th>Pro-opposition</th>
<th>Séléka ou proche des Séléka</th>
<th>Complaisance avec exaction des Séléka</th>
<th>Anti-Balaka ou proche des Anti-Balaka</th>
<th>Complaisance avec exaction des Anti-Balaka</th>
<th>(Expliquer pourquoi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3.1 Les journalistes/animateurs commentent-ils les faits présentés:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non</th>
<th>la proportion de commentaires reste faible (en deçà de de 20%)</th>
<th>la proportion de commentaires est forte en delà de 20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3.2 L’animateur commente-t-il les propos tenus par les invités

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### 3.3 Est-ce que l’animateur présente des intervenants ayant une opinion opposée ou rappelle-t-il les thèses opposées lors de l’intervention d’un invite ou de la diffusion d’un vox pop?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>Non</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Expliquer comment)

### 3.5 Est-ce que le traitement de l’animateur présente un biais:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>Non</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Expliquer lequel et comment cela se traduit-il)

### 3.6 Percevez des biais dans les discours pouvant présenter un danger dans le contexte actuel de conflit intercommunautaires (hate speech) ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>Oui</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.7 Details (Hate speech)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stéreotypes</th>
<th>Préjugés</th>
<th>Insultes</th>
<th>Déhumanisation des personnes appartenant à une communauté</th>
<th>Menaces</th>
<th>Affirmations gratuites incriminant une communauté (rumeurs)</th>
<th>Ridicule</th>
<th>Expressions codées discriminantes</th>
<th>Affirmations incitant à la violence</th>
<th>Diffamation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Lister toutes les caractéristiques du discours discriminants ou du discours de haine. Noter scrupuleusement et mot par mot les citations et l’heure. Décrire qui parle, ses fonctions, le contexte social et politique, les raisons qui la conduisent à tenir ces propos?

Quelle est l’audience du programme, quelles peuvent les conséquences directes de tels propos?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.8 Listes des invités ou autres intervenants lors de l’émission?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.8 Ajouter ici les problèmes de vocabulaire / sémantique / Associations d’idées</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.9 Autres manquements au Code d’éthique ou de déontologie

Diffamation envers gouvernement  
Diffamation ciblant l’opposition  
Diffamation ciblant la société civile  
Relais de rumeur non liées au conflit actuel  
Autres

(Expliquer quels est le manquement – référer à un article du Code si possible)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.10 L'animateur ou les autres intervenants/invites ont-ils réagi au propos discriminants ou diffamatoires ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Expliquer de quel manière)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11 L’émission parle-t-elle des causes du conflit ?</td>
<td>Oui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oui</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Si oui, précisez (marginalisation, pauvreté, faiblesse de l’Etat, instabilité politique, etc)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.12 L’émission parle-t-elle des besoins des populations ?</td>
<td>Oui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oui</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Si oui, lesquels ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.13 Le journaliste ou les sources proposent-ils des solutions ou des pistes de solution pour sortir de la crise, si oui, lesquelles ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annexer si besoin citations et feuilles supplémentaires à la fiche.
8.2 Type of content broadcasted by the 6 radio stations monitored by the OMCA’s media monitoring team (numbers of hours of broadcast programs)

Radio Centrafrique

Music represents 71% of the total schedule as music is massively broadcast during the night.
Radio ESCA

Music represents **87% of the total schedule.**

Linga FM